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People often conform to the behavior of others with whom they identify. However, it
is unclear what fundamental mechanisms underlie this type of conformity. Here, we
investigate the processes mediating in-group conformity by using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants completed a perceptual decision-making task while
undergoing fMRI, during which they were exposed to the judgments of both in-group and
out-group members. Our data suggest that conformity to the in-group is mediated by
both positive affect as well as the cognitive capacity of perspective taking. Examining the
processes that drive in-group conformity by utilizing a basic decision-making paradigm
combined with neuroimaging methods provides important insights into the potential
mechanisms of conformity. These results may provide an integral step in developing more
effective campaigns using group conformity as a tool for behavioral change.
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INTRODUCTION
People are often influenced by others with whom they identify.
They buy clothes similar to those of their peers, visit restau-
rants because their colleagues go there, and downloadmusic their
friends listen to. By adopting the tastes of others, people show
they belong to a specific group. This social factor, whereby peo-
ple follow the behavior or advice of others they associate with, has
been labeled in-group influence. It is not limited to product choice
(Bearden and Etzel, 1982; Berger and Heath, 2007, 2008), but
influences behavior even when identity signaling is not an issue.
For instance, a field experiment on household energy conserva-
tion showed that informing people about their neighborhood’s
average home energy usage resulted in a change in household
energy consumption, specifically toward the mean of their neigh-
borhood (Schultz et al., 2007). Similarly, a study on conservation
behavior found that hotel guests were more likely to reuse tow-
els when informed that guests who had stayed in that same room
had reused towels than if they were informed about the behavior
of guests in general (Goldstein et al., 2008).
Given the powerful influence of the in-group, it therefore
comes as no surprise that there has been an increase in the use
of group conformity as a tool for behavioral change. People often
overestimate both the degree of approval and the prevalence of
negative behavior among peers, such as drinking, drug use, vio-
lence, littering, or cigarette smoking (Baer et al., 1991; Donaldson
et al., 1994; Schultz, 1999; Neighbors et al., 2004; Berkowitz,
2010). Social influence-programs seek to correct these misper-
ceptions by exposing their target groups to the actual attitudes
of their peers and the real frequency of the undesirable behav-
iors. However, despite the initial popularity of these programs,
the evidence for their success in establishing behavioral change
has been mixed. Over time, many programs failed to change
behavior substantially (Peeler et al., 2000; Clapp et al., 2003), and
some social influence-programs even showed effects of increasing
the undesirable behavior they tried to reduce (Granfield, 2005;
Wechsler et al., 2003). The mixed findings on the effectiveness
of social influence-programs demonstrate that it is still unclear
exactly what psychological processes may mediate in-group con-
formity. In order to understand why and when people conform to
their in-group, we need to understand the mechanisms that drive
in-group conformity.
The aim of the present study was to gain greater insight into
the processes underlying in-group conformity. To examine the
mechanism of in-group conformity, we used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), a modern neuroscientific method that
provides a non-invasive measure of neural activity by assess-
ing regional changes in blood oxygenation [blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) response]. Using fMRI enables us to make
inferences about the processes that underlie in-group conformity,
which is difficult to assess using behavioral measures alone. In
addition, to investigate the basic underlying processes, we mea-
sured in-group conformity using an artificial groupmanipulation
and using a domain that was neither relevant for identity signal-
ing nor related to actual choice. Examining the neural processes
driving in-group conformity under these minimal conditions
provides fundamental insights into the basic brain mechanisms,
and may help in designing more effective social norm campaigns.
Although the application of neuroimaging methods in
decision-making research has increased in popularity during the
last decade, only recently have neuroscientists started to identify
the brain networks implicated in social influence, for exam-
ple examining the influence of experts (Klucharev et al., 2008;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010), the persuasiveness of celebri-
ties (Stallen et al., 2010), the mechanisms of racial bias (Beer
et al., 2008; Van Bavel et al., 2008; Gonsalkorale et al., 2011),
the influence of majority behavior on individual decision-making
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(Berns et al., 2005, 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011;Mason et al.,
2009), and, most relevant to the current investigation, the influ-
ence of in-group membership on both money allocation (Volz
et al., 2009) and helping behavior (Hein et al., 2010). Volz and col-
leagues (2009) investigated the neural implementation of social
identity theory, which assumes that each individual has both a
personal and a social identity, and that the way information is
processed depends on which identity of the individual is salient at
the time of decision-making (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The results
of Volz and colleagues (2009) support social identity theory by
demonstrating that the social self is derived from the same cogni-
tive processes as the individual self, as activation of both types of
identities resulted in similar neural patterns in the prefrontal and
parietal network. A second study on in-group influence by Hein
and colleagues (2010) investigated the neurobiological basis of the
decision to help either an in-group or out-groupmember in pain.
Their results showed that seeing an in-group member in pain
evoked more empathy-related responses in the brain than seeing
an out-group member in pain, and demonstrated that the degree
of this empathy-related response predicted in-group favoritism
in actual helping behavior at a later point in time. Importantly
however, none of these studies on social influence in the brain
examined the processes that underlie conformity to the in-group.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Twenty-eight healthy right-handed participants (mean age 20.7
years) took part in the experiment. All were free of neurologi-
cal or psychiatric illness, head trauma or drug abuse, and none
were taking medication. Written informed consent was obtained
according to the local medical ethics committee, and participants
were compensated financially. Data from three participants were
discarded due to technical problems, and one participant was
excluded because he guessed the study aim. This resulted in 24
subjects for final analyses (12 males). We used a repeated mea-
sures design with the identity of the group member (in-group or
out-group member) as a single within-subject factor.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects arrived alone to the experiment. Upon arrival, partic-
ipants’ group membership was manipulated using a minimal
group paradigm approach (Tajfel et al., 1971). In the task, adapted
from Volz et al. (2009), five perceptual illusions, such as the
young girl-old woman illusion, were shown for 2 s each, After
each illusion, two possible answers were displayed on the screen
and participants were asked to choose between them. Then, par-
ticipants were informed that they had been categorized as people
who either focus on the foreground of visual illusions, people who
focus on the background, or as people who could not be classified
into either of these two categories. Unbeknownst to participants,
everyone was classified as a foreground perceiver (in-group). The
other two groups (background and unclassified) will be referred
to as the out-group. We manipulated group membership artifi-
cially instead of using real, existing groups, as this allowed us to
control the (minimal) information participants had about their
in-group and out-group members, and hence ensured that the
hypothesized in-group conformity effect could not be explained
by factors other than group membership, such as for example
perceived differences in expertise in perceptual decision-making.
DECISION-MAKING TASK
After the perceptual illusion task, participants completed the
decision-making task while undergoing MRI (Figure 1). First,
participants were instructed to look at a dot pattern on a com-
puter screen for 1.5 s. The number of dots on display ranged from
5 to 30 (M = 15, SD = 7.5), and the participants’ goal was to esti-
mate the number of dots as accurately as possible. The number
of dots used was based on pre-tests conducted with a different
set of participants (N = 42). Pre-tests showed that, on average,
participants were able to estimate about 11 dots (SD = 2.2 dots)
correctly within 1.5 s. Because we required our experiment to
include both easy and difficult trials (easy trials were included to
ensure motivation), we varied the number of dots from 5 to 30
across trials. After the brief presentation of the dots, participants
were instructed to think about their estimate (duration jittered
between 2.5 and 6 s). Next, the estimate of a previous partici-
pant was displayed. This estimate came from either a member of
the same group as the participant, that is, a foreground perceiver
(in-group member) or from a member of a different group (out-
group member). Group membership of the other participant
(foreground perceiver, background perceiver or unclassified per-
ceiver) was indicated by a colored cartoon of either yellow, purple
or blue. Colors were counterbalanced to ensure no confound
between the color of the cartoon and group membership.
FIGURE 1 | Trial outline with duration times in seconds. Group
membership of the other participant was indicated by the colored cartoon.
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After presentation of the estimates, a response screen
appeared. This screen was identical to the previous screen
on which the estimate was presented, except for a response
bar displayed at the bottom of the screen. This bar consisted
of a row of numbers from 5 to 30, on which participants
were instructed to indicate their estimate. Responses were indi-
cated by scrolling to the number of their choice and press-
ing a confirmation button. The estimates provided by in-group
and out-group members were predetermined by a computer
script and, unbeknownst to the participant, were always cor-
rect. Finally, to enhance motivation, participants were told
that the group who performed best would win an (unspeci-
fied) prize, with the winning group notified at the end of the
study.
The presentation of a fixation screen (duration jittered
between 3.5 to 5 s) signaled the start of a new trial. Participants
performed 214 trials. To maintain attention, 6 self-paced breaks
were included. The total scanning session took approx. 55min.
MRI ACQUISITION PARAMETERS
Functional images were acquired with a 1.5T Siemens Sonata
scanner, using an ascending slice acquisition and a T2∗-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR 2.29 s, TE 30ms, flip
angle 70◦, slice matrix 64 × 64mm, slice thickness 3.0mm, slice
gap 0.5mm, FOV 224mm). Anatomical scans were acquired with
a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (176 sagittal slices, TR 2.25 s,
TE 3.93ms, flip angle 15◦, slice matrix 256 × 256, slice thickness
1.0mm, no gap, FOV 256mm).
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Behavioral questionnaires
To test the groupmanipulation, participants answered a question-
naire at the end of the experiment. This measured the level of
identification (“I feel connected to the blue/yellow/purple team”),
trust (“I trust people from the blue/yellow/purple team”), and
the degree of positive associations (“I have positive associations
with the blue/yellow/purple team”) toward other participants.
Responses ranged from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (very true).
Conformity
Conformity was assessed by calculating the percentage of trials
on which participants gave the same judgments as the in-group
or out-group member.
Brain imaging analyses
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using a standard software
package (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology
London). The first 5 images of each participant’s EPI sequence
were discarded to allow for longitudinal relaxation time. The
remaining images were realigned to the first imaging volume.
Functional images were corrected for motion and differences
in slice time acquisition. Next, images were normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template using parame-
ters defined from the normalization of the anatomical scan to
the MNI template, and images were smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 8mm full-width at half-maximum to reduce noise.
Motion parameters were stored and used as nuisance variables
in the general linear model (GLM) analysis. A random-effects
analysis within the framework of the GLM was applied to model
event-related responses (Friston et al., 1995).
Four regressors were defined for each participant based on
the onsets of the relevant trials: “Conformity to In-group,”
“Conformity to Out-group,” “Non-Conformity to In-group,” and
“Non Conformity to Out-group.” Brain responses were time-
locked to the presentation of the estimate of either the in-
group or out-group member. Regressors were modeled with a
canonical hemodynamic response function and a GLM anal-
ysis was used to create contrast images summarizing differ-
ences in brain activity across the Conformity to In-group and
Non-Conformity to In-group trials, as well as differences in
brain activity across the Conformity to Out-group and Non-
Conformity to Out-group trials. To test hypotheses regarding
brain areas that were uniquely involved in conformity to an
in-group member, we masked the brain activity present in
the In-group contrast map (Conformity to In-group > Non-
Conformity to In-group) with the Out-group contrast map
(Conformity to Out-group > Non-Conformity to Out-group)
(p < 0.05 uncorrected) (e.g., Pochon et al., 2002; Uncapher
et al., 2006; Enzi et al., 2009). This exclusive masking proce-
dure revealed activity in the In-group contrast map that did
not overlap with the brain areas involved in the Out-group
contrast map (p < 0.001, uncorrected, 10-voxel minimum). To
assess whether there was a relationship between brain activity
underlying conformity and the self-report measures assessed, we
correlated individual beta values of the reported brain activ-
ity with participants’ scores on the scales measuring identifi-




In line with the group manipulation, participants identified
more strongly with in-group members (M = 4.7, SD = 1.0)
than with out-group members (M = 3.2, SD = 1.0), t(23) = 5.4,
p < 0.001 (paired t-test). There were no differences in identifica-
tion between the two out-groups, that is, participants identified
equally with out-group members that were classified as back-
ground perceivers (M = 3.3, SD = 1.1) or that were not classified
(M = 3.2, SD = 1.2), t(23) = 0.6, ns. Consistent with an in-
group preference, participants had more positive associations
with in-group members (M = 5.8, SD = 0.6) than with out-
groupmembers (M = 4.9, SD = 0.9), t(23) = 4.3, p < 0.001, and
participants reported greater trust in in-group members (M =
4.9, SD = 1.1) than in out-groupmembers (M = 4.1, SD = 1.0),
t(23) = 3.3, p < 0.005.
BEHAVIORAL CONFORMITY
Participants conformed more often to in-group judgments than
to out-group judgments. The percentage of trials in which partic-
ipants’ judgment matched the estimate of the group member was
higher when seeing the estimate of an in-group member (M =
67.8%, SD = 9.4%) than an out-group member (M = 65.4%,
SD = 9.2%), t(23) = 2.8, p < 0.01. In-group conformity did not
differ between easy (≤11 dots), and difficult trials, t(23) = 0.5, n.s.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 50 | 3
Stallen et al. Neural mechanisms underlying in-group conformity
NEURAL CORRELATES OF IN-GROUP CONFORMITY (TABLE 1)
When examining brain areas exclusively involved in conformity
to the in-group, we found a significant increase in activity in
right caudate, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (subACC),
right hippocampus, and in the intersection of the right poste-
rior insula and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
(Figure 2). Analyses of the In-group contrast (Conformity to
In-group > Non-Conformity to In-group) and Out-group con-
trast (Conformity to Out-group > Non-Conformity to Out-group)
directly did not reveal any significant activation patterns. Next,
we calculated whether there were any correlations between the
neural activity underlying in-group conformity and participants’
self-reports on in-group trust and associations. Correlation anal-
yses were conducted for each brain region found to be involved
in in-group conformity, and corrected for multiple comparisons
accordingly (Bonferroni-corrected p < 0.0125). We found that
the activity in the posterior insula/pSTS positively correlated with
participants’ scores on the trustworthiness of in-group members
(r = 0.53, p < 0.01). Thus, the more trustworthy participants’
judged their in-group, the higher the activity in this region. No
other significant correlations were found.
DISCUSSION
To examine the basic processes that mediate in-group confor-
mity, we explored the neural mechanisms underlying this effect.
Activity in the caudate was selectively enhanced when participants
conformed to the in-group, supporting the hypothesis that the
striatum plays an important role in social influence (Klucharev
et al., 2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011).
The striatum, located in the center of the brain, is a major input
station for midbrain dopamine neurons and plays a primary role
in the processing of rewards, including primary rewards such as
liquids, foods, and sexual stimuli (Redouté et al., 2000; Berns
et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2003), as well as to money (Knutson
et al., 2000) and more abstract rewards such as reputation or sta-
tus (Izuma et al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008). The finding that the
striatum is involved in in-group conformity, in conjunction with
conformity-related activations in other low-level processing areas
such as the subACC, an area implicated in the experience of affec-
tive states (Drevets et al., 1997), and the hippocampus, an area
important for the retrieval of spatial memories (such as the dot
display) (e.g., Eldridge et al., 2000), suggests that in-group con-
formity is mediated by fundamental value signals in the brain.
Importantly, involvement of the subACC suggests that affective
signalsmay be related to the positive experience of social inclusion
in particular, as this brain region has been implicated in social
acceptance (Somerville et al., 2006), and also shown to be more
active for individuals low in rejection sensitivity (Burklund et al.,
2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that people conform
more to in-group members than to out-group members because
the behavior of in-group members is more strongly associated
with the experience of positive affect and reward.
Greater activity for in-group conformity was also found in a
region bordering the pSTS and the posterior insula, with peak
activity in the posterior insula but extending further into pSTS.
The pSTS is an area often implicated in the cognitive capacity of
perspective taking, typically termed Theory of Mind (Frith and
Frith, 2006). The concept of Theory of Mind is defined as the
Table 1 | Significant areas of activation associated with conformity toward in-group members.
Brain region HEM BA x y z Nr of voxels Max Z -score
Hippocampus R 20 36 −10 −18 101 4.6
pSTS/insula R 48 40 −20 0 68 4.6
SubACC - 11 0 26 −8 28 3.7
Caudate R 47 22 29 4 21 3.6
MNI coordinates of peak activity. HEM, hemisphere; BA, Brodmann area; pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; SubACC, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex.
FIGURE 2 | Brain regions involved in in-group conformity, p < 0.001 uncorrected. (A) subgenual ACC, x = 0; (B) pSTS/insula (circled in red) and
hippocampus (circled in yellow), x = 40; (C) pSTS/insula (circled in red) and caudate (circled in green), z = 4.
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understanding that others have their own individual perspective
on the world, which may differ from your own. Finding that the
BOLD response in the pSTS is selectively enhanced for in-group
conformity is interesting, as this could imply that participants
took the perspective of the other more when the other was an
in-group member than an out-group member. This hypothesis
supports previous work suggesting that people mentalize more
about in-group than out-groupmembers (Harris and Fiske, 2006;
Freeman et al., 2010; Heatherton, 2011). Moreover, activity in
the pSTS correlated with participants’ self-report measures on
the perceived trustworthiness of the in-group, again indicating
that those who reported strong feelings of trust toward their in-
group were more in-tune with the mental state of their in-group
member.
The present findings complement behavioral studies (e.g.,
Asch, 1951; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Cialdini and Goldstein,
2004; Jetten et al., 2004) and recent pharmacological work (Stallen
et al., 2012) on group influence, and expand on investigations of
the neural bases of both conformity (Berns et al., 2001, 2010;
Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Mason et al., 2009; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011; Berns andMoore, 2012),
and in-group influence (Volz et al., 2009; Hein et al., 2010).
Furthermore, our results provide potential relevant insights for
the design of social influence programs. We show that confor-
mity to the in-group is presumably mediated by both positive
affect as well as perspective taking. This suggests that social influ-
ence programs may benefit by emphasizing the positive aspects
associated with in-group membership rather than, for instance,
stressing the negative feelings associated with social exclusion.
Additionally, our data suggest that social influence-programs will
work more effectively when the target is stimulated to imag-
ine the state of mind of the in-group and “puts himself in
the others” shoes’, thereby facilitating perspective-taking pro-
cesses which may result in more trust directed toward in-group
information.
Future research could productively test these hypotheses, as
the present effects are small and the interpretations here are
based on previous research linking activity in specific brain
regions to basic cognitive functioning. In general, the ability to
assess with certainty the cognitive processing reflected by spe-
cific brain activity is challenging due to the multiple functions
brain regions typically engage in (Poldrack, 2006). Follow-up
behavioral and neuroimaging studies can reveal how the basic
mechanisms of in-group conformity reported here are modu-
lated by different contexts, in particular participant population
and decision-making domain. For instance, the conformity effect
reported here is quite small, likely due to the minimal conditions
under which in-group conformity was tested. However, when
using natural groups, such as friends or sports teams, and when
measuring conformity in a decision-making domain more closely
related to identity formation, such as consumption choice for
clothing, music, hairstyle, or food (Bearden and Etzel, 1982;
Berger and Heath, 2007, 2008), the present in-group conformity
bias would likely be stronger. In-group conformity in contexts
more relevant to identity formation may not only be medi-
ated by mechanisms of positive affect and perspective taking as
reported here, but by the activation of social identity processes
as well. A candidate brain region for these processes is the dor-
sal medial prefrontal cortex, as previous research has found this
area to be implicated in the activation of self and group iden-
tity and to correlate with a behavioral in-group bias (Volz et al.,
2009). In addition, our findings encourage the study of in-group
conformity across different age ranges. We found in-group con-
formity to be mediated by increased activity in the subACC, an
area known to be involved in social inclusion (Somerville et al.,
2006; Burklund et al., 2007) and positive affect (Kim et al., 2003;
Sharot et al., 2007) in adults. However, in adolescents the sub-
ACC has been found to correlate with social exclusion (Masten
et al., 2009). This may predict that while in-group conformity in
adults is primarily driven by the positive affect associated with
social inclusion, in-group conformity in adolescents might be
driven more by the negative affect associated with social exclu-
sion. Social influence campaigns targeted at adolescents may
therefore bemore effective when emphasizing the negative aspects
of social exclusion than the positive affect associated with social
inclusion.
CONCLUSION
The present findings complement recent work on the physio-
logical bases of both conformity (Breiter et al., 2001; Klucharev
et al., 2009, 2011; Mason et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011), and in-group influence
(Volz et al., 2009; Hein et al., 2010; Stallen et al., 2012). The
current study is a first step toward understanding the nature
of actual in-group conformity behavior, and provides a first
insight into what mechanisms may drive this effect. Our data
indicate that both positive associations linked to in-group mem-
bers, as well as the ability to take the perspective of the in-
group, likely play an important role in in-group conformity.
Understanding why group membership has such a profound
influence on decision-making provides a window into one of the
basic motivations underlying people’s behavior, and may help
in developing effective campaigns based on a social influence
approach.
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